One of the main goals of algorithmic game theory is to quantify the performance of a system of selfish agents. Usually the "social cost" incurred by all players is higher than if there is a central authority taking charge to minimize social cost. We will develop tools that will allow us to (upper and lower) bound the potential increase.
Motivating Example
Example 8.1 (Pigou's Example, Discrete Version). Consider the following symmetric network congestion game with four players. Observe that only states of kind (a) and (b) can be pure Nash equilibria. The social cost, however, is minimized by states of kind (c). Therefore, when considering pure Nash equilibria, due to selfish behavior, we lose up to a factor of 16 12 and at least a factor of 13 12 .
More generally, we refer to the worst-case ratio between the social cost at equilibrium and the optimal social cost as the price of anarchy.
Definition 8.2. Given a cost-minimization game, let PNE ⊆ S be the set of all states that are pure Nash equilibria. The price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria is defined as P oA PNE = max s∈PNE SC(s) min s∈S SC(s) .
Tight Bound for Affine Delay Functions
We next provide a tight bound on the price of anarchy for (non-decreasing) affine delay functions of the form d r (k) = a r · k + b r , where a r , b r ∈ Z ≥0 . 
In the remainder, we will show that
This then implies the desired bound. By definition, we have
Furthermore, as all d r are non-decreasing, we have
By exchanging the sums, we have
To simplify notation, we write n r for n r (s) and n * r for n r (s * ). Recall that delays are d r (n r ) = a r n r + b r . In combination, we get
This we will have to bound in terms of
The following lemma comes to our rescue.
Lemma 8.4 (Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, 2005) . For all integers y, z ∈ Z ≥0 we have
Proof. The case y = 0 is trivial. Next, we turn to the case y = 1. Note that, as z is an integer, we have (z − 1)(z − 2) ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
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Finally, consider the case y > 1. We now use
Using y ≤ y 2 2 , we get
Let us consider the term in Equation (2) for a fixed r ∈ R. We have
where in the second step we used that b r ≥ 0. Summing up these inequalities for all resources r ∈ R, we get 
Lower Bound
Theorem 8.5. There are congestion games with affine delay functions whose price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria is 5 2 . Proof sketch. We consider the following (asymmetric) network congestion game. Notation 0 or x on an edge means that d r (x) = 0 or d r (x) = x for this edge. There are four players with different source sink pairs. Refer to this table for a socially optimal state of social cost 4 and a pure Nash equilibrium of social cost 10.
player source sink strategy in OPT cost in OPT strategy in PNE cost in PNE 1
Other Equilibrium Concepts
To extend the notion of price of anarchy to other equilibrium concepts, we assume that there is a set Eq of probability distributions over the set of states S, which correspond to equilibria. In the case of pure Nash equilibria, each of these distributions concentrates all its mass on a single point. Again we set SC(s) = i∈N c i (s) but depending on the application it may also make sense to replace the sum by a maximum.
Definition 8.6. Given a cost-minimization game, let Eq be a set of probability distributions over the set of states S. For some probability distribution p, let SC(p) = s∈S p(s)SC(s) be the expected social cost. The price of anarchy for Eq is defined as
Given the respective equilibria exist, we have 1 ≤ P oS PNE ≤ P oA PNE ≤ P oA MNE ≤ P oA CE ≤ P oA CCE .
Example 8.7. Recall the game Chicken, in which two drivers are driving towards an intersection. They can either cross (C) or stop (S). If both cross, they crash and have a high cost.
C(ross) S(top)
C(ross) 100 1 100 0
The only two pure Nash equilibria are (C, S) and (S, C), which are both socially optimal. So P oA PNE = 1. However, there is another, symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, in which both players cross with 1 100 probability and stop with 99 100 probability. For this probability distribution p, we have SC(p) = 
Smooth Games
A very helpful technique to derive upper bounds on the price of anarchy in all these equilibrium concepts is smoothness. Definition 8.8. A game is called (λ, µ)-smooth for λ > 0 and µ < 1 if, for every pair of states s, s * ∈ S, we have
Observe that this condition needs to hold for all states s, s * ∈ S, as opposed to only pure Nash equilibria or only social optima. We consider the cost that each player incurs when unilaterally deviating from s to his strategy in s * . If the game is smooth, then we can upperbound the sum of these costs in terms of the social cost of s and s * .
Effectively, we already proved the following theorem when we were bounding the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 8.9. Every congestion game with affine delay functions is 5 3 , 1 3 -smooth. From such a bound, getting a bound on the Price of Anarchy is easy: If s is a pure Nash equilibrium and s * is socially optimal, then
(as s is a pure Nash equilibrium)
On both sides subtract µ · SC(s), this gives
and rearranging yields
But the argument does not stop here: Smoothness directly gives a bound even for coarse correlated equilibria.
Theorem 8.10. In a (λ, µ)-smooth game, the PoA for coarse correlated equilibria is at most
Proof. Let s be distributed according to a coarse correlated equilibrium p, and let s * be an optimum solution, which minimizes social cost. Note that SC(p) = E s∼p [SC(s)]. Then:
(by linearity of expectation) That is, in a (λ, µ)-smooth game, we have P oA PNE ≤ P oA MNE ≤ P oA CE ≤ P oA CCE ≤ λ 1 − µ .
For many classes of games, there are choices of λ and µ such that all relations become equalities. These games are referred to as tight. We have already seen one such example: All congestion games with affine cost functions are ( 
